Causal assumptions : some responses to Nancy Cartwright by Kristtorn, Sonje
 
CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS:  
SOME RESPONSES TO NANCY CARTWRIGHT 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of 
Graduate Studies and Research 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Science 
In the Department of Computer Science 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon 
 
By 
 
SONJE KRISTTORN 
 
 
 
Keywords: causal inference, causal markov condition, faithfulness assumption, causal graphs 
 
© Copyright Sonje Klara Kristtorn, July, 2007. All rights reserved.
 i 
 
 
 
PERMISSION TO USE 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a 
Postgraduate degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of 
this University may make it freely available for inspection.  I further agree that 
permission for copying of this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly 
purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis work 
or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which 
my thesis work was done.  It is understood that any copying or publication or use of this 
thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written 
permission.  It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the 
University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in 
my thesis.                                                                                                                      
 Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of material in this thesis in 
whole or part should be addressed to: 
Head of the Department of Computer Science 
176 Thorvaldson Building 
 110 Science Place 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada 
S7N 5C9 
 ii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The theories of causality put forward by Pearl and the Spirtes-Glymour-Scheines 
group have entered the mainstream of statistical thinking. These theories show that under 
ideal conditions, causal relationships can be inferred from purely statistical observational 
data. Nancy Cartwright advances certain arguments against these causal inference 
algorithms: the well-known “factory example” argument against the Causal Markov 
condition and an argument against faithfulness. We point to the dependence of the first 
argument on undefined categories external to the technical apparatus of causal inference 
algorithms. We acknowledge the possible practical implication of her second argument, 
yet we maintain, with respect to both arguments, that this variety of causal inference, if 
not universal, is nonetheless eminently useful. Cartwright argues against assumptions that 
are essential not only to causal inference algorithms but to causal inference generally, 
even if, as she contends, they are not without exception and that the same is true of other, 
likewise essential, assumptions. We indicate that causal inference is an iterative process 
and that causal inference algorithms assist, rather than replace, that process as performed 
by human beings. 
 
 iii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Eric Neufeld, for help and encouragement, 
always kindly and generously given. I am also grateful for the companionship and 
support of my friends, Qingjuan Guan and Maryruth Pradeepa Joseph Lawrence, inside 
and outside the lab. My thanks, too, to the members of my Advisory Committee, who 
read the thesis and offered helpful comments and advice.  
 
  iv  
 
   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
                                                                                                                                         
Page 
 
ABSTRACT ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii 
LIST OF FIGURES v 
INTRODUCTION 1 
NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY, DEFINITIONS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND 
ALGORITHMS 3  
     DAGS and Probability Distributions 3  
     Causal Graphs 9 
     The Markov Condition and the Causal Markov Condition 21  
CARTWRIGHT’S CRITIQUE 22  
     The Faithfulness Assumption 22  
     The Markov Condition and the Factory Example 24  
SOME RESPONSES TO CARTWRIGHT 29  
     The Factory Example and the Fundamental Assumption 29  
     The Faithfulness Assumption 44  
CONCLUSIONS 55 
REFERENCES 59  
 
 
 
  v  
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure page 
 
2-1.  B is conditionally independent of A, given C .............................................................5 
 
2-2.  A is conditionally independent of B, given C .............................................................6 
 
2-3. A is conditionally independent of B, given C ..............................................................7 
 
2-4. A and B are conditionally dependent, given C.............................................................8 
 
2-5. Causal relationships between playing an Instrument, Conflict, and Stress................11 
 
2-6. Possible orientations of the arcs .................................................................................13 
 
2-7. C is a genuine cause of D ...........................................................................................15 
 
2-8. A hidden common cause is inconsistent with the definition ......................................16 
 
2-9. Y and C have a hidden common cause.......................................................................17 
 
4-1. The Chemical and the By-product are dependent in all contexts ...............................31 
 
4-2. Cartwright’s “true” causal graph ................................................................................32 
 
4-3. C and B are conditionally independent, given F ........................................................39 
 
4-4. C is conditionally independent of B, given E and P...................................................40 
 
4-5. Qualitative causal model of sunscreen, melanoma and darkness of skin...................46 
 
4-6. Causal model output by IC algorithm.........................................................................47 
 
4-7. Melanoma doesn’t respond much to Sunscreen .........................................................50 
 
4-8. Manipulating Sunscreen after fixing Darkness ..........................................................51 
 
4-9. Results of setting Sunscreen usage.............................................................................53 
 
 
 
  1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Certain algorithms, it is claimed, can derive causal structure form observational 
data. Perhaps the best known of these are the IC (Inductive Causation) algorithm put 
forward by Judea Pearl and Thomas Verma [22] [23] and the PC (probably named for 
Peter and Clark) algorithm proposed by Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour, and Richard 
Scheines (SGS hereafter) [27]. The IC algorithm assumes perfect information and so 
abstracts from problems of data and error. As a result, it has an uncluttered clarity that is 
well suited to our purposes and we use it as our paradigmatic causal inference algorithm 
in what follows.  
There are some who find the claims made for these algorithms “too good to be 
true”. A prominent critic along these lines is philosopher Nancy Cartwright. In a series of 
books and articles she has argued against causal inference algorithms. Our discussion 
centres on two arguments in The Dappled World [3]. Broadly speaking, she argues that 
causal inference algorithms are valid only in restricted circumstances and that, in fact, the 
world is far more complex and untidy than they assume. More precisely, she challenges 
two assumptions fundamental to causal inference algorithms. The first, in informal terms, 
is the assumption that “dependency implies causality”. This is not the naïve media fallacy 
that correlation (or dependency) indicates a cause and effect relationship but a deeper 
notion that the presence of dependencies manifests an underlying, explanatory causal 
structure. We call this the Fundamental Assumption and we argue that it is the real target 
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of her factory example argument. The second is the assumption of Faithfulness, that 
independencies and dependencies in data faithfully reflect causal structure.  
In response, again speaking broadly, we note that many of the complicating 
features of the world she alleges, features, she claims, that render the Fundamental 
Assumption invalid in many if not most instances, lack formal or precise definition, 
making it difficult to assess or respond to her arguments. Further, we observe that 
reasoning in a messy, complicated world relies on general principles that are not 
universally valid but essential nonetheless. Closely tied to this is another observation, that 
causal inference, like other forms of reasoning, is an iterative process. We maintain that if 
the two assumptions under discussion are not without exception, they fall into the 
category of fallible but necessary assumptions, and we point out that causal inference 
algorithms are not meant to replace human reasoning but to assist it, to serve as a tool in 
the iterative process of causal inference. However useful the tool – and we regard causal 
inference algorithms as exceptionally useful – human intervention remains critical and 
the fact that reasoning about causality, like other forms of reasoning, depends on general 
principles or assumptions that lack universal validity is one reason why this is so. We 
illustrate this with respect to the Faithfulness Assumption.  
   In the next chapter (chapter 2), we review relevant notation, definitions, 
assumptions, and a simple version of the IC algorithm. With this foundation in place, 
chapter 3 presents Cartwright’s arguments. Chapter 4 contains our responses to those 
arguments. In the last chapter, we summarize our conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY, DEFINITIONS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND 
ALGORITHMS 
Before we consider Cartwright’s arguments, we need to give an account of what 
she is criticizing. What follows is by no means complete, but it is sufficient for our 
purposes and omits unnecessary, and perhaps distracting and confusing, features.  
DAGs and Probability Distributions 
Call S = {x1, …, xn }, a set of individuals under discussion, a sample space. Then 
a variable A is any partition of S. For the present discussion, A divides S into two parts, 
which we typically identify as a and  ~a, the outcomes of A. Here, A is a binary variable.1 
Then, we can say that  
                                                       
! 
p a( ) =
|| a ||
|| S ||
                                                  (1.1) 
The joint probability p(ab) denotes the proportion of individuals in both a and b, 
and can be written 
                                                      
! 
p ab( ) =
a"b
S
                                              (1.2) 
Where 
! 
a"b  is shorthand for the set of elements of S that are members of both a and b. 
Then, when p(b) ≠ 0, the conditional probability p(a|b)  is just  
                                                 
! 
p a |b( ) =
p ab( )
p b( )
                                                            (1.3) 
                                                 
1 It is easy to generalize the discussion to n-ary variables, including continuous variables, but because that 
would require discussion and notational machinery superfluous to our purposes, we do not do so. 
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Variables A, B are conditionally independent given a set of variables C if 
                                                            p(A,B|C) = p(A|C)·p(B|C)                                  (1.4) 
for all outcomes of A, B and C. If C is empty, then A, B are unconditionally independent.  
A graph is a pair G=(V,E) where V is a set of vertices (or nodes) and E is a set of 
edges or arcs between pairs of vertices (vn, vm).  In a directed graph, the edges have 
direction, so that the direction of an arc (vn, vm) is from vn to vm. A cycle is a path, 
following the directionality of the arcs from one vertex to another, that begins and ends at 
the same vertex. Thus, a cycle Cn consists of n vertices v1, v2, ..., vn connected by edges 
(v1, v2), (v2, v3), ....., (vn-1, vn), (vn, v1). A Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) is a directed 
graph that has no cycles.2 
Our concern is with DAGS as they are used to represent probability distributions 
(although they have other applications, too).  A DAG that represents a probability 
distribution is a pair (D,P), where D=(V,E) is a directed graph, vertices represent 
variables, and P is a probability distribution over V.  The structure of the graph represents 
independence – and, conversely, dependence – relationships in the data as follows: For 
any variable A, variables directly connected to A by incoming arcs are denoted 
parents(A), and described as the parents of A. A itself is a child of its parents and parent 
of its children, themselves descendents of the parents of A. A is conditionally independent 
of all other variables, its descendants excepted, given its parents. Associated with A is a 
local distribution f (A, parents(A)), which gives a distribution for A for any set of values 
that parents(A) take on. f can be a discrete or continuous probability distribution or a 
                                                 
2 In causal graphs, acyclicity corresponds to the intuition that an event can’t cause itself, though we are 
running somewhat ahead of ourselves in making this observation.  
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structural equation.3 The structure of the graph thus encodes the information that P 
factors into the product of the conditional distributions stored at the nodes. For discrete 
variables, then,          
                                P(v0,...,vn) = Πi P(vi|parents(vi))                                    (1.5) 
Factorization can make probabilistic reasoning computationally feasible in both time and 
space, where the graph is sparse. This way of representing independence relationships in 
the data is summarized in what is termed the Markov Condition (MC): A vertex is 
conditionally independent of its non-descendants, given its parents.4 
 
Figure 2.1:  B is conditionally independent of A, given C 
For example, the simple graph in Figure 2.1 encodes the information that B is 
independent of its non-descendent, A, given its parent, C.  A and B are dependent, but not 
dependent in all conditioning contexts. On the other hand, a node and its parent(s), are 
always dependent, that is, they are dependent in all contexts, for all conditioning sets. So 
the graph shows that A, C and C, B are always dependent or dependent in all contexts. 
                                                 
3 Here, we focus on discrete distributions, though the algorithms and definitions discussed employ an 
abstract notion of independence. 
4 The Markov Condition implies many other conditional independencies. These can be detected from D 
using a graph-theoretic criterion called d-separation [23]. But we need not discuss this. 
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Note that the graph in Figure 2.2 expresses the same set of independencies (and, 
therefore, dependencies).  
 
Figure 2.2: A is conditionally independent of B, given C 
In Figure 2.3, A and B have a common parent, C. The graph shows that A, C and 
B, C are always dependent. It also indicates that A is conditionally independent of its non-
descendent B, given its parent, C, and equivalently, that B is conditionally independent of 
A, given C.  Otherwise, A and B are dependent. This is the same set of independence 
relations portrayed both in Figure 2.1 and its mirror image, where the directions of the 
arcs are reversed, in Figure 2.2. Often a given set of independencies can be represented 
by different graphical structures. Graphs that represent the same independence relations 
are said to be Markov equivalent. 
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Figure 2.3: A is conditionally independent of B, given C 
 
While the three graphs shown above are Markov equivalent, the head-to-head 
structure in Figure 2.4 shows that A and C are always dependent, as are B and C. A, 
which has no parents, is unconditionally independent of its non-descendent B and B is 
likewise unconditionally independent of A.5 On the other hand, A and B are conditionally 
dependent, given C. If this last seems counter-intuitive, consider the dependencies 
between A, C and B, C. Knowing the value of A tells us nothing about the value of B. 
However, if we know the value of C, the value of A will tell us something about the value 
of B, since C is dependent on both A and B. Suppose, for example, that Cold (A) and 
Sneeze (C) are always dependent and that Hayfever (B) and Sneeze (C) are always  
dependent, while Cold (A) and Hayfever (B) are independent. The fact that someone has 
or does not have a Cold (A) has no bearing on the probability that the same person has 
Hayfever (B). However, if we know that someone is Sneezing (C), then knowing that he 
or she does not have a Cold (A) does tell us something about the probability that the 
                                                 
5   It is not necessary for the unconditional independence of A and B that A and B be ‘parentless’ but to 
avoid unnecessary complications, and because in the example A and B are orphans, we stated the matter as 
we did. 
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person has Hayfever (B). Once we know the value for Sneezing (C), Cold (A) and 
Hayfever (B) are dependent.  
 
 
Figure 2.4: A and B are conditionally dependent, given C 
The MC implies that all independencies represented in the graph exist in the data 
the graph represents. But it does not imply that all independencies in the data can be 
derived from the graph. To put it another way, the MC does not say that the distribution 
contains only the independencies represented in the graph or, to put it yet another way, 
that all independencies in the data are represented in the graph. That information is given 
in a version of the Faithfulness Assumption (FF). We refer to this version as 
Faithfulness1(FF1) to distinguish it from another, and much more common, version 
discussed below, usually referred to as the Faithfulness Assumption without qualification. 
The former, FF1, unlike FF, is not an assumption at all but a further description of the 
relationship between a probability distribution and a DAG. It says that all independencies 
in the data are represented in the graph. As such, it supplies the converse of the if 
contained in the Markov Condition. The upshot is an if and only if between the 
independencies represented in a graph and independencies in a distribution. According to 
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the MC, if an independence relationship is represented in the graph, then it is present in 
the data. FF1 says that if an independence relationship is present in the data, then it is 
represented in the graph.  
Causal Graphs 
In the previous section, a DAG was presented as a compact encoding of a joint 
probability distribution that exploits independence knowledge to gain efficiency in space 
and time. In this section, we consider DAGs as representative of causal relationships 
between variables.6 The algorithms and definitions in this section all assume the 
availability of perfect (zero sampling error) measurements. We also assume that our 
domain has no cycles or feedback loops.7 Again, for the most part, the only association 
mentioned is probabilistic dependence, though the definitions and algorithms can easily 
accommodate correlations and covariances between continuous variables.  
A causal interpretation of a DAG that represents a probability distribution 
depends on two assumptions and some definitions. Both assumptions concern the 
relationship between probability distributions and causal relationships. The first 
assumption is that dependency implies causation: if A and B are dependent in all contexts, 
then A causes B (directly, though there may be unmeasured mediating causes), B causes A 
(again directly, with the same qualification), or A and B have a hidden common cause 
which would, if measured and conditioned on, render them conditionally independent. 
This also means (by modus tollens) that the absence of these three causal relationships 
between A and B implies independence in some context (including the empty context). 
                                                 
6 We shall employ a common verbal shortcut and speak of causal relationships between variables rather 
than, more precisely, of causal relationships between what the variables represent. 
7 In fact, it is possible to take feedback into account, but this simplified presentation omits that possibility. 
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We’ll call this the Fundamental Assumption (FA). Informally, it amounts to the claim that 
dependency implies causality and that absence of causality implies independence. 
The second, faithfulness [28] (or stability [23]) assumption, is that all 
independencies in the distribution are entailed by causal structure. To paraphrase Kyburg 
[15], no independencies result from “numerical coincidences”. (This is what, above, we 
called FF.) There is a close relationship between the Faithfulness assumption and the 
Fundamental Assumption. Essential to FF is an idea that is the converse of FA: if A 
causes B, B causes A, or A and B have a hidden common cause, A and B will not be 
independent in any context, that is, they will be dependent in all contexts. Equivalently, if 
A and B are independent in some context, including the empty context, then A does not 
cause B (directly, as above), B does not cause A (directly, likewise as above), and A and B 
do not have a hidden common cause. More succinctly, and less precisely, independence 
implies no causation and causation implies dependence. 
Faithfulness says that there are no independencies that do not reflect causal 
structure, no independencies between variables that have a (direct) causal relationship. 
Suppose, for example, that playing a musical Instrument (I) reduces Stress (S). But 
suppose also that the same activity leads to Conflict (C) with neighbours or housemates 
and that Conflict increases Stress. Figure 2.5 depicts this causal structure. What would 
happen if the amount of stress reduced by the direct causal pathway I→S were exactly 
equal to the stress created on the causal pathway I→C→S? In that case, p(S|I) would 
equal p(S); that is, S and I would be unconditionally independent in the distribution in 
spite of the direct causal relationship between them. The Faithfulness Assumption 
assumes that this kind of thing does not happen; it assumes that dependencies along 
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different causal paths do not exactly balance or cancel each other out so as to create an 
apparent independence that fails to reflect the true causal relationship between variables. 
The Faithfulness Assumption might be considered an application of Ockham’s razor to 
causal inference. Failure to make this assumption, on this understanding, introduces 
unnecessary complexity. 
Figure 2.5: Causal relationships between playing an Instrument, Conflict, and Stress 
The import of the Fundamental Assumption and the Faithfulness Assumption 
taken together is that if variables are dependent in all contexts, there is a direct causal 
relationship between them or a hidden common cause (FA) and if there is a direct causal 
relationship between variables or a hidden common cause, they will be dependent in all 
contexts (contra positive of FF and converse of FA). Likewise, if there is no direct causal 
relationship, the variables will be independent in some context (contra positive of FA) 
and if two variables are independent in some context, then there is no direct causal 
relationship between them (FF). Hence, there is dependency in all contexts if and only if 
there is a direct causal relationship between variables or a hidden common cause and 
  12 
there is independency in some context if and only if there is no direct causal relationship 
or hidden common cause8.  
Judea Pearl’s definition of potential cause (Definition 1) [22], builds on these 
assumptions:  
A is a potential cause of C if there is a variable B and a context S such that 
1. A, B are independent given S,  
2. there is no context T such that A and C are conditionally independent given T,    
      and 
3. B and C are dependent. 
Condition 1 says that there is a variable or set of variables, S, including the empty 
set, that, when conditioned on, renders A and B conditionally independent. If S is the 
empty set, A and B are unconditionally independent but conditional independence is 
enough to satisfy condition 1. Condition 2 says that A and C are always dependent, that 
is, that they are dependent in all contexts. Condition 3 requires that B and C are 
dependent. This is consistent with their being independent in some context or, like A and 
C, dependent in all contexts.  
A simple example illustrates the intuition behind this definition. The example 
satisfies the above definition, with some additional information. A and B are 
unconditionally independent (S is the empty set) or, if they are conditionally independent, 
S does not include C. Moreover, B and C are dependent in all contexts. In the example, 
then, the definition applies in two ways: First, A is potential cause of C, where the 
dependency between A and C satisfies condition 2 and the dependency between B and C 
                                                 
8 This is sometimes given a more relaxed form: Dependence means causality and independence means no 
causality. 
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satisfies condition 3. Secondly, B is a potential cause of C, where the dependency 
between B and C satisfies condition 2 and the dependency between A and C satisfies 
condition 3.  
Figure 2.6 shows all possible orientations of the arcs between A, B, and C. On the 
basis of the representation discussed in section 1 above, summarized in the Markov 
condition, only the fourth graph is consistent with the dependencies and independencies 
specified by the definition (with the additional restrictions). In the first graph, B is 
conditionally independent of its non-descendant, A, given its parent, C, and otherwise 
dependent, contrary to the above information, according to which S (condition 1) is the 
empty set (so that A and B are unconditionally independent) or S does not include C. The 
same reasoning applies to its mirror image in the second configuration. In the third graph, 
A and B are again dependent and conditionally independent, given C, and, again, this is 
inconsistent with the information about the relationships between the variables. Only the 
orientation of the arcs in the fourth image represents the dependencies and 
independencies specified in the (more restrictive) definition: A and B are unconditionally 
independent while A, C and B, C are dependent in all contexts.  
Figure 2.6: Possible orientations of the arcs 
Thus far, all we have done is mapped the dependencies and independencies given 
in the (restricted) definition. If we invoke the relationships between dependency and 
causality specified in our two assumptions, we can give the four graphs a causal 
A 
  C 
B  A 
   C 
 B    A 
  C 
B A 
   C 
B 
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interpretation. By those assumptions, dependency in all contexts exists if and only if there 
is a direct causal relationship between variables or a hidden common cause and 
independency in some context (including the empty set) if and only if there is no direct 
causal relationship.  
So the first two graphs, which are ruled out because they are inconsistent with the 
dependencies given in the (restricted) definition, represent, on these assumptions, a causal 
chain from A to C and from C to B or, in the other direction, from B to C and C to A. 
According to the third, C is a common cause of A and B. The fourth, the only one 
consistent with the definition, indicates A and B as causes of C.   
In fact, the last statement needs to be qualified. The fourth graph shows that A and 
C and B and C are always dependent and that A and B are independent. According to the 
Fundamental Assumption, this means that A causes C or that A and C have an 
unmeasured common cause. The same is true of B and C. For this reason, the definition is 
a definition of potential cause.  
Where certain conditions are met, it is possible to exclude the possibility of a 
hidden common cause. These conditions are given in Pearl’s definition of Genuine Cause 
[22] (Defintion 2). A variable C is a genuine cause of D if 
1. A is a potential cause of C. 
2. C and D are dependent in all contexts. 
3. A and D are dependent.  
4. A and D are conditionally independent given C. 
Figure 2.7 depicts these relations, using a bold arrow to indicate genuine 
causality: 
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Figure 2.7: C is a genuine cause of D 
 This definition depends on the idea that the dependence between C and D cannot 
be explained by a hidden common cause (U) without coming into conflict with the 
independence information in the data. This is easiest to see if we suppose that U is 
measured and represent the dependencies/independencies involved in a graph. According 
to our assumptions about causality and dependence, if U is a common cause of D and C 
then U, C and U, D are dependent in all contexts and C and D are conditionally 
independent, given U. The corresponding graph would look like the one in Figure 2.8, 
where U is represented by a question mark.  It is apparent from the graph, using the MC 
to see the independencies involved, that A and D are unconditionally independent and 
conditionally dependent given C contrary to the conditions set forth in the definition. 
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Figure 2.8: A hidden common cause is inconsistent with the definition 
A non-causal version of this definition makes no assumptions about the 
relationship between causality and dependency. Rather, it shows that the possibility that 
the dependence between two variables derives from their common dependence on a third 
unmeasured variable can be eliminated where the relationships given in the definition 
obtain. (Condition 1 refers to potential cause but need not. As we saw in our earlier 
discussion of the definition of Potential Cause, a non-causal version of this definition can 
be given in terms of dependence and independence relationships.) The graph in Figure 
2.8 depicts this situation – U and C always dependent, U and D always dependent, C and 
D conditionally independent, given U – and, as above, shows its incompatibility with the 
dependencies and independencies given in the definition. This is a useful result.  
It is also possible in certain cases to detect the presence of a hidden common 
cause or to detect the presence of a hidden variable. Taking the causal version first, where 
there are two variables, each of which is a potential cause of the other, the explanation is 
a hidden common cause. Thus, two variables, B and C, have a hidden common cause 
(Definition 3) if  
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1. C and B are always dependent. 
2. A and C are always dependent. 
3. D and B are always dependent. 
4. D and C are unconditionally independent. 
5. D and C are dependent given B. 
6. A and B are unconditionally independent. 
7. A and B are dependent given C. 
Figure 2.9: Y and C have a hidden common cause 
These conditions are represented in a DAG as shown in Figure 2.9. If we interpret 
the graph causally, in accordance with our assumptions, the double-headed arc between C 
and B means either that C causes B and B causes C or that C and B have a hidden 
common cause. Since it cannot be that C causes B and B causes C (at the same time), they 
must have a hidden common cause.  
Another way to understand this is to consider that A, B, and C satisfy the 
definition of potential cause given above (Definition 1) so that B is a potential cause of C. 
(A is also a potential cause of C but that is beside the point here.) Similarly, C, B, and D 
satisfy the definition of potential cause. B is therefore a potential cause of C (and D of B 
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but, again, this is unimportant). This makes C and B each a potential cause of the other. 
Since they cannot be genuine causes of each other, and since the definition of potential 
cause includes the possibility of a hidden common cause, it must be that C and B have a 
hidden common cause.  
The non-causal version of the definition determines that the dependency between 
two variables derives from their common dependence on a third, unmeasured variable. 
The graph that corresponds to Definition 3 has head-to-head arcs at C and B. 
(Alternatively, we can say that, according to Definition 3, A, C, and B satisfy Definition 1 
as do C, B, and D.) The difficulty lies with the resulting double-headed arc between C 
and B which indicates that B is conditionally independent of A, given C (A -> C -> B), 
contrary to conditions 5 and 6.  Likewise, C is conditionally independent of D, given B 
(C <- B <- D) contrary to conditions 4 and 5. The solution is to replace the double-headed 
arc with a latent (that is, a variable that has not been measured or represented) variable as 
parent of C and B. This representation both eliminates and explains the contradictions 
involved in the representation it replaces.  
Pearl’s causal graph construction algorithm, the Inductive Causation (IC) 
algorithm, builds on these definitions. Here is a simple version of the algorithm, based on 
the generalized algorithm in [23]: 
1. For each pair of vertices A, B in a set of vertices, V, search for a subset S of V  
(including the empty set) such that A is conditionally independent of B given S. If no such 
S exists, let there be an undirected edge between A and B. 
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2. For each collinear triple of vertices A—C—B, where A and B are nonadjacent, 
test whether the S that renders A, B independent includes C. If not, add head-to-head 
arrows at C. Repeat this step until no more arrows can be added.  
3. For all remaining undirected arcs, add arrows, subject to two constraints: Do 
not create any new structures like those in Step 2 and do not create any directed cycles. 
Given the results of the previous steps and subject to these constraints, generate all 
possible graphs. Then take the intersection of those graphs so that any arc that is 
consistently oriented in all the graphs is so oriented in the output graph; otherwise, the arc 
is unoriented. 
Initially, every node is connected to every other node by an undirected link. In 
step one, for each pair of nodes A, B, the algorithm searches for a (possibly empty) set of 
nodes S such that A and B are independent given S. If such a set S exists, the link between 
A and B is removed. This step determines all direct links, which show that the variables 
concerned are always dependent, that is, they are not independent in any context. 
In step two, the algorithm looks at each collinear triple, A—C—B. The direct links 
indicate that A, C are always dependent and that C, B are always dependent and the lack 
of a direct link between A, B shows that they are conditionally or unconditionally 
independent, given some S (empty if they are unconditionally independent). Step two 
checks that S does not include C and then orients the arcs in the only way that is 
consistent with these dependencies and independencies. (See the discussion of Definition 
1 above.)  
Step three is logical rather than probabilistic. Any structures like those determined 
in step two will have been found in step two. In addition, it is assumed that the graph 
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does not contain directed cycles. Finally, only orientations that would appear in any 
graph generated by the algorithm appear in the final output. 
The algorithm as presented above refers to dependencies and independencies in 
the data but makes no reference to causality. However, invoking our assumptions about 
dependency and causality, we can give a causal interpretation both to the algorithm itself 
and to the resulting graphs. In step one, two variables are joined by an arc if they are 
always dependent. On our two assumptions, such a dependency exists if and only if there 
is a causal relationship between the two variables. Either one is the cause of the other or 
they have a hidden common cause. Step two determines that A and B are potential causes 
of C and orients the arcs accordingly, as described earlier. The further orientation of the 
arcs that takes place in step three provides further indications of causal direction.  
The output of the algorithm is a graph containing undirected arcs, directed arcs, 
and arcs directed in both directions. Directed arcs indicate not only dependency 
relationships between variables, as described in the first section of this chapter, but, on 
the assumptions about dependence and causality outlined above, causal relationships. 
Arcs directed at both ends indicate dependencies that can only be explained by the 
presence of an unmeasured common parent variable, or, interpreted causally, the presence 
of a hidden common cause. (See Definition 3 above). Undirected arcs indicate that there 
is insufficient information to orient an arc. The algorithm also ‘marks’ any arcs 
representing dependencies that cannot be attributed to dependency on an unmeasured 
variable or common cause. In causal terms, these represent genuine causal relationships. 
(See Definition 2 above.)  
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The Markov Condition and the Causal Markov Condition 
The Markov condition, as Richard Scheines says, is “just mathematics connecting 
DAGs and probability distributions” [25]. It describes the way a graph represents 
dependencies and independencies in a probability distribution: A variable is conditionally 
independent of its non-descendants, given its parents.  When, on the basis of the 
assumptions about the relationships between dependency and causality contained in the 
Fundamental and Faithfulness Assumptions, a graph is interpreted causally, the Causal 
Markov Condition (CMC) describes the way a graph represents causal relationships: A 
variable is conditionally independent of its non-effects, given its direct causes. In other 
words, when a graph is interpreted causally, the Markov condition describes not only the 
representation of dependencies and independencies in data but, given the assumed 
relationships between dependencies and causality (and, in the case of a graph constructed 
using the IC algorithm, the associated definitions and the algorithm), causal relationships 
or causal structure.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CARTWRIGHT’S CRITIQUE  
The causal inference algorithms of Pearl and SGS rest on certain assumptions 
about relationships between causal structure and probabilities, including, on Cartwright’s 
account, faithfulness and the Markov Condition. Cartwright argues not that these are 
never correct but that they are far less frequently correct than Pearl and SGS suppose. 
This chapter presents Cartwright’s arguments without comment. The following chapter 
discusses and responds to these arguments.  
The Faithfulness Assumption 
In Chapter 2 we saw that the Faithfulness Assumption can be considered an 
application of Ockham’s razor to causal inference and Pearl argues along these lines, 
using an analogy from perceptual inference. Suppose we see a picture of what appears to 
be a chair. We can take the object in the picture to be a chair (T1) or we can regard it as 
two chairs aligned so one hides the other (T2). T1 is invariant to the angle of view, and T2 
is unlikely. In this sense T1 is simpler than T2. The point of the analogy is that when we 
observe independencies in data we have to decide whether these correspond to causal 
structure, that is, whether they represent an absence of causal relationship, or whether, on 
the contrary, what appears to be causal independence is actually an exact balancing of 
dependencies that conceals a causal relationship. The former, Pearl argues, is the simpler, 
and therefore the preferred, theory.  
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Another, Bayesian, argument appeals directly to the unlikelihood of the 
interpretation the Faithfulness Assumption rejects. For two variables A and B, for any 
distribution of A, so the argument goes, there is exactly one joint distribution of A,B such 
that the two variables are independent, but in all the remaining uncountably many 
distributions, the two variables are dependent. Hence, the probability of correlation, given 
causation, has measure one.  
This argument holds if all distributions are equally likely. Nancy Cartwright, [3], 
however, argues convincingly that the kind of cancellation the Faithfulness Assumption 
precludes may occur fairly frequently.  
It is not uncommon for advocates of DAG-techniques to argue that cases 
of cancellation will be extremely rare, rare enough to count as non-
existent. That seems to me unlikely, both in the engineered devices that 
are sometimes used to illustrate the techniques and in the socio-economic 
and medical cases to which we hope to apply the techniques. For these are 
cases where means are adjusted to ends and where unwanted side effects 
tend to be eliminated wherever possibly, either by following an explicit 
plan or by less systematic fiddling. 
Elsewhere [4], she gives a convincing example. Birth-control pills may cause 
thrombosis but they also prevent pregnancy, which likewise can cause thrombosis. 
Depending on the strengths of the dependencies involved, these influences may cancel 
and, indeed, this cancellation is something we try to achieve. We try to weaken the 
strength with which birth-control pills cause thrombosis so that those who use the birth-
control pill are no more liable to thrombosis than those who don’t. In this case, “getting 
the cancellation that stability/faithfulness prohibits is important to us”. In applied science 
or engineering, we may want to retain a process for some reason (perhaps it has some 
effects we value along with the ones dislike) or it may be easier to design a counter 
process to cancel certain of its effects than it is to eliminate the first process and a case 
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can be made that the same kind of thing happens in nature. Shipley, though he remarks 
that such balancing occurs “only under very special conditions” [26] gives an example 
from nature (photosynthesis) where processes act as counterweights to establish a set 
point (internal CO2 concentration). Since the theory of causal graphs cannot get far 
without the faithfulness assumption, this is potentially devastating. 
The Markov Condition and the Factory Example 
The focus of our discussion here is Nancy Cartwright’s criticism of the Markov 
Condition (what we have been calling the CMC) in The Dappled World [3], in particular, 
in the argument that centers on her ‘factory example’. This argument, and even this 
example, can be found elsewhere in her work as well. (See below.)  
 For Cartwright, the Markov Condition describes two kinds of conditional 
independencies. (She is discussing what we have been calling the Causal Markov 
Condition. This chapter follows her usage.) The first of these she justifies by the temporal 
relationships between causes. Causes do not operate “across temporal gaps”, so 
conditioning on the parents (or direct causes) of a variable makes it independent of its 
indirect ancestor variables (and of their descendants). The conditional independence of B 
from A, given C, depicted in Figure 1 in the previous chapter was an example of this. The 
second aspect is the screening off of variables that share a common parent: Conditioning 
on the common parents of two or more variables ‘screens them off’ from one other, that 
is, renders them conditionally independent (assuming neither sibling is a descendant of 
the other). Conditioning on the common parents of two or more variables, according to 
the Markov Condition, makes them independent. In the previous chapter, the conditional 
independence of A and B, given their common parent, C (Figure 3) is an example of this 
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aspect of the Markov condition. It is this ‘screening off’ aspect of the Markov condition 
that she finds troublesome.  
 Screening off, she says, is ‘trivially true’ where the relationship between cause 
and effect is deterministic, when causes fix the values of their effects. So, for example, in 
the simple case of a single cause of two effects, if I know the value of the cause, I know 
the value of each effect. Knowing the value of the other effect tells me nothing about the 
first that I don’t know already, once I know the value of the cause. Hence, the effects are 
independent of each other, given the cause. Formally, p(E1 | C, E2 ) = P(E1 | C), where C 
represents the cause and E1 and E2 represent the effects of C. This means that the joint 
probability of two effects, given the cause(s) of those effects, will factor: p(E1, E2 | C) = 
p(E1 | C) p(E2 | C). However, according to Cartwright, deterministic causality is 
uncommon and the Markov condition does not (in general) hold where causality is 
probabilistic.  
When a cause operates probabilistically the relationship between the value of the 
cause and the value of the effect is, of course, probabilistic. For a given value of the 
cause, there is a probability distribution over the possible values of the effects. (In the 
deterministic case, there is one possible value for each effect, given the cause, with 
probability 1.0; any other values have probability 0.0.) Cartwright argues that the value of 
one effect of a probabilistic cause will almost always provide some information about the 
value of a second effect, even if I know the value of the cause. In other words, the effects 
are not conditionally independent, given their common cause; likewise, the joint 
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(conditional) probabilities will not factor. In Cartwright’s terms, there is no ‘screening 
off’.9 
This is so, Cartwright maintains, because of “interactions” between the 
“operations” whereby a cause produces its various effects.10 In the case of deterministic 
causality, such interactions need not be considered since a cause, when it occurs, 
infallibly operates to produce all of its effects. But in the case of probabilistic causality, 
we have to consider not only the probabilistic relationships between a cause and each of 
its effects but also the relationships, likewise probabilistic, between the operations that 
produce the effects. When a cause can occur and yet not operate to produce one or more 
of its effects, such interactions have to be taken into account when calculating the 
probability of one or another effect, even when we know the value of the cause. The 
screening-off aspect of the Markov condition, according to Cartwright, assumes what she 
calls a “split-brain model” of the common cause”, according to which a cause operates 
independently to produce each of its effects. However, Cartwright asserts that, in fact, 
“joint operations” are common. Hence, even when we know the value of the cause, 
knowing the value of one effect is likely to tell us something about the value of the other.  
It is in this context that Cartwright presents her factory example. There are two 
factories, D and P. Both produce a certain chemical, C, that is used immediately in a 
sewage plant. Factory D produces the chemical with probability 1.0, or deterministically. 
Factory P, on the other hand, produces the same chemical with probability 0.8, that is, 
probabilistically. Moreover, whenever P produces the chemical, a pollutant, B, is 
                                                 
9 In the next chapter, we explain why we regard the factory example as an argument against what we have 
called the Fundamental Assumption. We maintain that, even if correct, this argument is not fatal to causal 
inference algorithms. 
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produced as a by-product. However, the owner of factory P maintains that the pollutant is 
produced when the chemical is used in the sewage treatment plant and, in support of this 
claim, advances an argument that assumes the Markov condition in its screening-off 
aspect. The factory-owner argues that if Factory P did indeed produce the pollutant as 
well as the chemical, the probability of the pollutant would be conditionally independent 
of the probability of the chemical, “assuming all other causes of …. [chemical and 
pollutant] have already been taken into account”. Thus, Factory P argues that if it were 
responsible for the pollutant then ( ) ( ) ( )PBpPCpPBCp |||, = . But in fact p(C,B|P) is 
0.8 while the two factors are likewise each 0.8; therefore, argues factory P, it is not 
responsible for the noxious by-product, since 0.8 ≠ 0.8 · 0.8.  
But factory P’s argument is wrong, says Cartwright.  Factory P is responsible for 
the by-product. Factory P’s error lies in its screening-off assumption. Because factory P 
produces both the chemical and the by-product probabilistically, knowing the value for P 
does not tell us whether it produced either of its two effects, whether, as Cartwright says, 
it “fired”; it tells us only that the probability is 0.8 in either case. But knowing the value 
of the by-product variable, B, as well tells us something about this and thereby provides 
information about the value of the chemical variable, C, that we would not know simply 
by knowing the value for P. As a result, the probabilities of C and B are not independent 
given P and hence do not factor, that is, ( )PBCp |, ≠ ( ) ( )PBpPCp || . Yet P is the cause 
of both C and B.  
Cartwright buttresses this example with a negative conceptual argument in 
combination with a “what are the odds?” argument. First, she clears the ground with an 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Cartwright’s use of these categories (“operations” and “interactions”) presents difficulties. This, too, is 
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appeal to causal concepts: There is nothing in the concept of causality that implies 
‘screening off’; “nothing in the concept of causality, nor of probabilistic causality, 
constrains how nature must proceed”. Then she employs an argument much like the 
Bayesian argument for Faithfulness (mentioned above) against “screening off”. How 
likely is it, when we have a joint probability distribution over the effects of a common 
cause, that the distribution will be such that the effects are conditionally independent? 
The answer, she says, is “not very”. She concludes, “where causes act probabilistically, 
screening off is not valid”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOME RESPONSES TO CARTWRIGHT 
 In Chapter 2, we discussed the Markov condition, which describes the way a 
graph represents independencies (and dependencies) in data. We discussed also the 
Causal Markov condition, which, on the basis of two assumptions about the relationships 
between dependencies and causality – the Fundamental Assumption and the Faithfulness 
Assumption - describes the way a graph represents causal relationships. Finally, we 
discussed the IC causal inference algorithm, which invokes both assumptions in the 
construction of a causal graph to which both the Markov condition and the Causal 
Markov conditions apply. Chapter 3 briefly outlined Cartwright’s objections to causal 
inference algorithms. These take the form of arguments against the Causal Markov 
condition in its “screening off aspect” and the Faithfulness Assumption. In this chapter, 
we respond to Cartwright’s objections.  
The Factory Example and the Fundamental Assumption 
In the factory example [3], factory P argues that if the factory were the direct 
causal parent of both by-product (B) and chemical (C), then, assuming the validity of the 
Markov Condition in its “screening off” aspect – that effects are conditionally 
independent, given their common cause(s) – and assuming also that “all other causes” of 
C and B “have already been taken into account”, conditioning on the factory should make 
the chemical and the pollutant by-product independent. Since the chemical and the by-
product are not conditionally independent, given the factory, it cannot be that the factory 
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is responsible for the pollutant by-product as well as the chemical. Yet, Cartwright 
informs us, the factory is responsible for the by-product. Factory P’s argument is faulty 
because its “screening off” assumption is not valid where causes act probabilistically, as 
they do here and, in fact, as they do in most instances. Because factory P produces both 
the chemical and the by-product probabilistically, there is a probabilistic relationship 
between the operations whereby it produces each. “Knowing that the cause occurred,” 
that is, that factory P was operating on a given day, “will not tell us whether the product 
[the chemical] resulted or not. Information about the presence of the by-product will be 
relevant since this information will tell us (in part) whether, on a given occasion, the 
cause actually ‘fired’”. 
That information about the presence of the by-product is not sufficient of itself to 
establish whether factory P “fired” and produced the chemical, suggests that the by-
product may be absent in the presence of the chemical or present in its absence or that 
one or both may have a source other than factory P. The latter possibility is consistent 
with the assumption that any other causes of C and B have been taken into account, since 
that assumption does not exclude other causes. More importantly, if we take that 
assumption to mean that any other causes of C and B are included in the conditioning set 
with factory P, we can conclude that the chemical and the pollutant variables are 
dependent in all contexts and step 1 of the algorithm would place (or, more precisely, 
leave) an arc between the chemical and the by-product variables. The graph would look 
like the one in Figure 4.1.   
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Figure 4.1: The Chemical and the By-product are dependent in all contexts 
From the perspective of this graph, it is far from obvious that the factory example 
is a counter-example to the Markov condition. The independencies and dependencies 
represented in the graph, according to the Markov condition, are consistent with those of 
the example; in particular, the chemical and the pollutant are not conditionally 
independent, given the factory. In other words, the graph does not imply what Cartwright 
terms “screening off”. Accordingly, our initial response to the factory example argument 
was that the example does not challenge the Markov condition. If the chemical and the 
by-product are not conditionally independent, the algorithm will place an arc between 
them.11 Factory P’s argument assumes that effects of a common cause must be 
conditionally independent, given their common cause, ignoring the possibility of a causal 
                                                 
11 The IC algorithm would not orient any of the arcs but we have oriented the arcs between factory P and 
the Chemical and between P and the By-product to accord with the causal information given in the 
example. 
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relationship between the effects or of another, hidden, common cause (though Cartwright 
seems to have ruled out the latter possibility in this example).  
However, a later paper [2] clarifies the example somewhat. There, Cartwright 
provides a graph of the “true” (the quotations are hers) causal structure. (See Figure 4.2) 
In this graph there is no arc between chemical and by-product, which means that, 
according to the Markov condition, they should be conditionally independent, given the 
factory.12 It would appear, then, that her argument is made with respect to the “true” 
causal structure.  It is the Markov condition as applied to the “true” causal structure of the 
example that implies the conditional independence, given the factory, of chemical and 
by-product, contrary to the statistical dependencies given in the example and (correctly) 
represented in Figure 4.1. The discrepancy between the “true” causal graph and the graph 
representing the dependencies and independencies of the example suggests another 
interpretation of Cartwright’s argument.  
 
Figure 4.2: Cartwright’s “true” causal graph 
                                                 
12 Cartwright’s graph includes the other factory (Factory D), but for our purposes, that is unnecessary.  
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On this interpretation, Cartwright has no quarrel with the Markov Condition, 
which describes a graphical representation of dependencies and independencies in data. 
Her quarrel is with the Causal Markov Condition, which says that the kind of graphical 
representation the Markov Condition describes will also represent causal relationships.13 
The latter describes a “matching” between causal structure and dependency graph that, 
according to Cartwright, does not exist in the factory example. In the factory example, 
the chemical and by-product variables must be conditionally independent, given the 
factory, if the dependency graph is to correspond to the “true” causal structure. Because 
this is not so, the Causal Markov condition is invalid.  
The difference is located in the arc representing the dependency between the 
chemical and the by-product. Since this arc is present in the graph that represents 
dependencies and independencies between variables but absent in the graph representing 
“true” causal relationships, and since the example stipulates that there is no hidden 
common cause, this arc must correspond to a non-causal dependency. The argument thus 
seems to be that what makes the Causal Markov condition invalid is the presence of a 
dependency that exists in all contexts and does not reflect or derive from a causal 
relationship between the chemical and the by-product or from a hidden common cause of 
both. This amounts to a denial of what, in chapter one, we called the “Fundamental 
Assumption”. We shall return to this later. 
It seems reasonable to associate this non-causal dependency with the probabilistic 
relationship that, according to Cartwright, exists between the operations of the factory to 
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produce the chemical and the by-product. The factory example is presented as an 
example of a cause that operates probabilistically to produce its effects. Cartwright 
maintains that, where causality is probabilistic – as, she claims, it usually is – there is a 
probabilistic relationship between the operations whereby it produces its various effects 
and that it is because of such “joint operations” that the (Causal) Markov condition, in its 
“screening off” aspect, is not valid.  
A subsequent article [4] is consistent with this interpretation and further 
elucidates Cartwright’s position. Having critiqued the faithfulness assumption and the 
assumption that causality implies dependency that follows from it, she turns to the 
question of whether dependency implies causality - what we have termed the 
“Fundamental Assumption” – and the Causal Markov condition.14 She begins with the 
uncontroversial point that a probabilistic dependency between A and B may derive from 
different circumstances. It may be that A causes B or vice versa but there are other 
possibilities. Of those she enumerates – and these are not uncontroversial – two have a 
particular bearing on the factory example. One is that A and B have a common cause 
“where either the causes are deterministic or the action of producing B is independent of 
the action of producing A”. The other is that A and B are “produced as product and by-
product from a probabilistic cause”.   
 Cartwright contends that “advocates of Bayes nets acknowledge and try to deal 
… squarely” only with the first. The Causal Markov condition, which states that a 
variable is conditionally independent of all variables except its own effects, given its 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Cartwright doesn’t distinguish the Markov condition from the Causal Markov condition and speaks 
throughout of the “Markov condition” but it seems that what she has in mind is what we have been calling 
the “Causal Markov condition”. 
14 It is perhaps significant that the later paper does use this terminology. 
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direct causes, discriminates dependencies deriving from a causal relationship from 
dependencies that derive from a common cause under the conditions given (deterministic 
causality or independent operations of a single cause).  If a dependency derives from a 
common cause (or causes) of this kind, and not from a causal relationship between the 
dependent variables, then the dependent variables will be conditionally independent, 
given the common cause(s). Dependencies that correspond to causal relationships 
between the dependent variables are those that persist when causal parents are 
conditioned on.15 “To claim that this is enough to ensure a causal connection,” she says, 
“is to maintain the causal Markov condition”.16  
Cartwright claims that it is not enough. The Causal Markov condition, she argues, 
holds under the stated conditions. However, there are dependencies that survive all 
conditioning, dependencies that exist in all contexts, which nonetheless do not derive 
from a causal relationship. Where, for example, the dependent variables are the product 
and by-product of a probabilistic cause, the product and by-product will always be 
dependent, even when their common cause is conditioned on. Contrary to the Causal 
Markov condition, these dependencies do not derive from a causal relationship. This is 
precisely the situation Cartwright describes in her factory example.  
In an earlier work [1] she discusses “joint operations” of another kind and a 
resulting non-causal dependency.  
“A typical case occurs when a cause operates subject to constraint, so that 
its operation to produce one effect is not independent of its operation to 
produce another. For example, an individual has $10 to spend on 
                                                 
15 The Causal Markov condition might also be considered to discriminate dependencies deriving from an 
indirect causal relationship from those deriving from a direct causal relationship. This is suggested by 
Cartwright’s discussion of the first aspect of the Markov condition in The Dappled World. 
16 “Advocates of Bayes nets” would say that a hidden common cause may also be a possibility in such 
cases, but Cartwright is not concerned with that possibility here. 
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groceries, to be divided between meat and vegetables. The amount that he 
spends on meat may be a purely probabilistic consequence of his state on 
entering the supermarket; so too may be the amount spent on vegetables. 
But the two effects are not produced independently. The cause operates to 
produce an expenditure of n dollars on meat if and only if it operates to 
produce an expenditure of 10 – n dollars on vegetables. Other constraints 
may impose different degrees of correlation.  
In this example, the common cause is the shopper’s state of mind on entering the 
store while the (non-causally dependent) effects are the amount spent on meat and the 
amount spent on vegetables. These are given as a = the amount spent on meat and 10 – a 
= the amount spent on vegetables but could just as easily have been a = the amount spent 
on vegetables and 10 – a = the amount spent on meat. The relationship between the 
operations that produce these effects is described as an “if and only if” relationship. The 
value of each effect implies the other; they are perfectly inversely correlated 
measurements. Hence, each effect is conditionally independent of the only other variable 
involved, the common cause of both (the shopper’s “state”), given the other. According 
to the Markov condition, then, when the example is represented graphically, each is 
parent of the other and the result is an isolated cycle, a cycle between two variables 
unconnected to any other variable.17 Recall that in Chapter 2, we mentioned that the IC 
algorithm assumes that there are no directed cycles and that this assumption corresponds 
to an intuition that a thing does not cause itself. These observations suggest, first, that the 
example is ruled out as an appropriate subject for the IC algorithm and, secondly, that the 
two effect variables in fact represent different ways of measuring the same thing and are 
properly considered a single variable, in other words, that they are proxies for the same 
entity.  
                                                 
17 The IC algorithm would eliminate any arcs other than the one between the two effect variables but would 
not orient it. (See Chapter 2.) 
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Likewise, in the factory example, if the by-product is produced if and only if the 
chemical is produced, it is arguable both that the example is excluded a priori as 
appropriate material for the IC algorithm and that the variables Chemical and By-product 
are proxies for the same thing. However, the example is unclear on this point. In [5] 
Cartwright says that the chemical and by-product are “always produced together” and in 
[3] she says that the by-product is produced whenever the chemical is produced and we 
might expect that the by-product is not produced unless the chemical – of which it is a 
by-product – is produced. On the other hand, Cartwright appears to say at one point that 
knowing the value of the by-product variable is not enough to establish the value of the 
chemical variable. (See above.) It may be significant that many, if not all, Cartwright’s 
examples of non-causal dependencies seem to involve if and only if relationships 
between the dependent variables (though in most cases she says that some less than 
perfect dependency would serve as well to make her point) since all such examples are 
open to these same objections.  
Cartwright’s response to an argument similar to the “single variable” objection 
above, made with respect to another example involving perfectly correlated side effects, 
is that while this would save the Causal Markov condition, it would not allow us to study 
“causal relations among the kinds of quantities we are generally interested in” [5]. 
Indeed, we may be interested in these quantities, but it does not follow that they are 
appropriately investigated by the kinds of methods under discussion, which require 
variables defined in the way chapter two describes.  
Before we leave the question of variables, we should make some mention of a 
common technique for dealing with the kind of difficulty Cartwright presents in her 
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factory example [3]. According to the story, factory P may or may not ‘fire’ and produce 
the chemical (and likewise, the pollutants). Is the occurrence or non-occurrence of this 
event adequately represented by the Chemical (C) and By-product (B) variables, 
representing, respectively, the production or presence of the chemical and the by-
product? As we saw earlier, Cartwright says that “information about the presence of the 
by-product will be relevant since this information will tell us (in part) whether, on a given 
occasion, the cause actually ‘fired’”. That being the case, and since the ‘firing’ of factory 
P is an event that may or may not occur, perhaps it should be represented by a Fired (F) 
variable, as in Figure 4.3. P(fired | factory P) would then be 0.8. (It is probably not 
necessary to have a ‘fires’ variable for the other factory.) The Fired variable would 
determine (or fix) the value of its effects. The probability of each would be 1.0, given 
fired = 1.0. This is the kind of situation where, Cartwright avers, “screening off” is 
“trivially true”. Once we knew whether factory P had ‘fired’ we would know the values 
of both the chemical and by-product variables. Knowing the value of one of the effects 
would therefore provide no further information about the value of the other. In the case of 
the alternative scenario, where the by-product does not invariably accompany the 
chemical, the byproduct would be produced with some probability less than 1.0 but it 
would still be true that, once the value of the “fired” variable was known, there would be 
nothing further to be known about the value of the Chemical variable from the value of 
the By-product variable and vice versa. The Fired variable would be a common cause of 
both the chemical and the pollutant that would render them conditionally independent 
when conditioned on. This is a “move” made by Hausman and Woodward in an early 
response to Cartwright’s factory example [13].18 Thus, Hausman and Woodward reify 
                                                 
18 They have lately taken a different tack that is beyond the scope of the present work. 
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Cartwright’s “processes” and “interactions” – we shall say more about these in what 
follows – and construct a complete explanation of the observed data consistent with the 
Bayes Net formalism, but also explicating and answering Cartwright’s domain-specific 
concerns. However, Cartwright might reply that there is no way to determine directly 
whether the factory has ‘fired’ apart from the presence of the chemical or the by-product. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: C and B are conditionally independent, given F 
Here is another variation of the same “move”: Suppose the arc between Chemical 
and By-product is interpreted as representing a potential cause. A potential cause may be 
either a genuine cause or a hidden cause. We have suggested that it might represent a 
genuine causal link but suppose it represents a hidden common cause. Then the “true” 
causal model might be as shown in Figure 4.4.  
 
 
P 
B C 
F 
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Figure 4.4: C is conditionally independent of B, given E and P 
Now, the distribution of each of Chemical and By-product must be specified in 
terms of the joint distribution of something like barometric pressure (E, on the 
supposition that this kind of Environmental factor has an influence) and factory P. This is 
less vulnerable to the charge of employing a handy recipe that can be used to make any 
two dependent variables independent than is Hausman and Woodward’s solution, since it 
explicates a possibility inherent in the definition of potential cause. It is true that 
Cartwright stipulates against hidden causes of C and B. However, it might be said that the 
“interactions” between “operations” that are so prominent in her discussion of the factory 
example look suspiciously like hidden causes. 
This brings us to what we might describe as our second response to Cartwright. 
Whereas the causal graph world consists of arcs and variables and CPTs (Conditional 
Probability Tables), Cartwright introduces “operations”, “probabilistic relations” 
between “operations”, and “joint operations”, which somewhat resemble variables and 
dependencies, without making precise the nature of these new entities, their relationships 
P 
C B 
E 
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to each other, or their differences from, and relationships to, the old categories. How do 
we distinguish an operation from a variable (including a latent variable) or a dependency 
(correlation)? How do we distinguish a probabilistic relationship between operations 
from a dependency (correlation) between variables? Can we measure them and can we 
represent them in such a way as to eliminate potential graphs from consideration as viable 
causal models? The problem, in our view, is that Cartwright has expanded the ontology 
without precisely defining the categories she introduces. The Causal Markov condition is 
an integral component of a formally expressed set of definitions and algorithms, yet she 
provides nothing comparable by way of formalism for her own categories, though they 
play a crucial role in her critique of the Causal Markov condition and, by extension, the 
definitions and causal inference algorithms with which it is associated. This makes it 
difficult to interpret or respond to her claim that the existence of such entities or 
processes fatally undermines the claims made on behalf of causal inference algorithms. 
A related point is that, although the “operations” of a cause and the “probabilistic 
relations” between those “operations” are central to Cartwright’s argument, neither is 
represented in causal graphs, or so it would appear from her factory example. Again, 
what are they? Can we measure them? If they are as devastating to causal inference 
algorithms as she maintains and if they can be measured, perhaps the solution is to 
represent them in causal graphs, altering or expanding the algorithm as necessary. Even if 
her arguments against the Causal Markov condition are valid, whether the Causal Markov 
condition would hold for these expanded causal graphs is an open question. But neither 
this question nor the prior question of the validity of her criticisms of causal inference 
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algorithms and causal graphs as they now stand can be addressed in the absence of 
precise definitions for the expanded ontology she proposes. 
 There is also the question of how Cartwright understands causality. The claim 
that the dependency between the chemical and the by-product is non-causal is at the heart 
of her argument. Cartwright tells us that even when we know the value of the factory 
variable (and any other causes of the chemical and the by-product), knowing the value of 
the by-product variable tells us something more about the value of the chemical variable. 
Are they causally related? Cartwright says that they are not. 
Yet, Cartwright insists that causality as multifarious [3]:  
Causes make their effects happen. That is more than, and different from, 
mere association. But it need not be one single different thing. One factor 
can contribute to the production or prevention of another in a great variety 
of ways. There are standing conditions, auxiliary conditions, precipitating 
conditions, agents, interventions, contraventions, modifications, 
contributory factors, enhancements, inhibitions, factors that raise the 
number of effects, factors that only raise the level, etc. 
In view of this, we question whether the relationship between chemical and 
pollutant in the factory example really is a non-causal relationship.19 We further question 
whether and to what extent it matters, for our purposes. At the very least the dependency 
between them is worth knowing. It contributes to predicting and explaining. It helps us to 
navigate reality (or it would if the factory example were real, as opposed to imaginary). 
That, arguably, is the purpose of causal graphs and therefore the arc that represents that 
dependency is not something we would want to leave out.  
But perhaps there are dependencies that persist in all contexts and that are not 
causal in any sense and that, if interpreted as indicating a causal relationship or a hidden 
common cause, would mislead us. Perhaps, in other words, there are exceptions to the 
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Fundamental Assumption of a sort that would lead to significant errors in the output of 
the kind of causal inference algorithms we are discussing. This brings us to our primary 
response to Cartwright.20 Even if exceptions to the Fundamental Assumption, and 
therefore to the Causal Markov condition, exist, the IC algorithm and causal graphs are 
nonetheless valuable, though not infallible, tools in the process of causal discovery.  
In fact, it is not easy to imagine how human beings (or, indeed, other animals) 
would live without something like the Fundamental Assumption. If, as Cartwright argues, 
it not without exception, it is nevertheless essential. Hausman and Woodward [14] make 
a similar point when they argue that  “even though fallible…, the causal Markov 
condition may still be our best hope for making causal inferences from non-experimental 
data, at least when strong domain-specific background knowledge is lacking”.  We would 
add that this is precisely the setting in which the algorithms are intended to be deployed. 
Where causal structure of the world already is well known, there is no need for causal 
inference algorithms. These are useful when we lack knowledge of true causal structure 
apart from probability distributions.21  
Causal discovery, as performed by human beings, is an iterative process. We 
should not be surprised, then, if causal discovery as performed by causal inference 
algorithms likewise requires iterative correction and improvement. We maintain that 
causal inference algorithms can assist, but not replace, human knowledge and reasoning. 
Human beings drive the iterative process, selecting and preparing data, interpreting 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 This issue is complicated by the fact that, as we have said, it is far from obvious what that relationship is. 
20 For the moment, we ignore the difficulties inherent in Cartwright’s account of such non-causal 
dependencies in terms of an expanded and non-specific ontology and likewise disregard the particularities 
of the factory example. 
21 However, it must be admitted that if exceptions to the Causal Markov condition are as common as 
Cartwright claims, their utility would be correspondingly limited. On the other hand, this question is all tied 
up with the questions about her terminology discussed above. 
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results, detecting possible errors, formulating hypotheses, testing, and initiating the next 
iteration. Human insight is particularly useful in locating problems and overcoming 
limitations deriving from exceptions to general rules and assumptions. In sum, exceptions 
to the Fundamental Assumption, and therefore to the Causal Markov condition, would 
not be fatal to the IC algorithm (or to similar algorithms).  
Of course, if such exceptions exist, it would be useful to understand their nature. 
This is where our secondary response to Cartwright comes in. Her use of new (for this 
area of investigation) and undefined categories makes it is difficult to grasp the nature of 
the exceptions for which she argues and it is correspondingly difficult to assess their 
existence or prevalence. 
The second prong of Cartwright’s critique is an argument that exceptions to the 
Faithfulness Assumption are not uncommon. Our response to this argument parallels our 
primary response above and includes an example of human intervention in the computer-
assisted process of causal discovery. 
The Faithfulness Assumption 
Cartwright argues that “cancellations” incompatible with the Faithfulness 
Assumption are frequent. This argument is clear and plausible and we accept that the sort 
of cancellations she describes may indeed occur frequently. It may be easier in applied 
science and/or engineering to design a counter process to cancel certain effects of a 
process than it is to eliminate the process causing the effect in the first place. Thus, a case 
can be made that Nature, as engineer, frequently uses the same ploy. Yet we do not 
regard the existence of such exceptions to Faithfulness as fatal to causal inference 
algorithms anymore than we do the possible existence of exceptions to the Fundamental 
Assumption and for the same kinds of reasons. As we argued with respect to the 
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Fundamental Assumption, something like the Faithfulness Assumption plays an 
important role in human causal inference and it is difficult to see how we – or a causal 
inference algorithm - could do without it. Further, and as we have also said, causal 
inference algorithms, like human causal inference, are iterative. Finally, they should be 
regarded as useful tools rather than as replacements for human reasoning. They require 
human co-operation and assistance, particularly where exceptions to general rules or 
assumptions are concerned. 
Here is an example of how this can work. In this example, the user employs a 
visualization tool developed by Neufeld and Guan [12]. Dennis et al [9] report a meta-
study of studies of the relationship between sunscreen use and melanoma. While it has 
been assumed that sunscreen use reduces the risk of melanoma, some reports suggest that 
sunscreen use actually increases the risk for melanoma. However, the meta-study 
determined that several such reports failed to take into account different sunscreen usage 
rates as between light-skinned and dark-skinned people, who are more and less 
susceptible to melanoma, respectively. Figure 4.5 shows the qualitative causal 
relationships involved between sunscreen use (S), melanoma (M) and darkness of skin 
(D), but does not indicate the sign or magnitude of the causal relationships. In 
Cartwright’s terms, Figure 4.5 shows the “true” (as above, the quotation marks are hers) 
causal structure. 
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Figure 4.5: Qualitative causal model of sunscreen, melanoma and darkness of skin 
Our example supposes that reports showed no relationship between sunscreen use 
and incidence of melanoma. (This is almost as surprising as the actual reports.) Our 
supposition is that higher melanoma rates amongst those with higher sunscreen usage 
rates (light-skinned people) exactly balance lower melanoma rates amongst those with 
lower sunscreen usage rates (dark-skinned people), rendering sunscreen usage and 
melanoma independent. Thus recast, it is an instance of the kind of violation of the 
Faithfulness Assumption advanced by Cartwright, that is, it is an example of “canceling” 
or “balancing” dependencies along different causal pathways and resulting independence 
between causally related variables. 
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Figure 4.6: Causal model output by IC algorithm 
The causal model output by the IC algorithm would then look like the one in 
Figure 4.6. The model shows a world where melanoma and sunscreen are independent 
common potential causes of darkness of skin, and mathematically is a minimal 
representation of possible causal relationships in a world coherent with the raw data. 
(Chapter 2 includes a simplified description of the reasoning involved.) Because the 
example violates the Faithfulness Assumption, this model is incorrect. To a human being, 
this causal configuration will appear highly implausible.22 Accordingly, using the 
visualization tool mentioned above, the user constructs what he or she suspects may be 
                                                 
22 In domains where the variables are not so well understood, the user can use the model to see what 
predictions it makes about interventions, and test these predictions in the actual domain. This would 
involve experimenting with setting, which we discuss below. 
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the correct causal model in order to explore the relationship between Sunscreen and 
Melanoma. 
However, before we describe this, we need to introduce a distinction between 
seeing and setting. Seeing is the common procedure of computing a conditional 
expectation—given a subpopulation of a known population, what is the posterior 
distribution of all related variables in the subpopulation? For example, we may wish to 
compute p(M|see(S)), the probability that someone we see using sunscreen might develop 
melanoma. This can be computed as the ordinary conditional probability P(M|S): 23 
! 
p M | see S( )( ) = p M |DS( )p D | S( ) + p M |¬DS( )p ¬D | S( )                      (4.1) 
In this discrete formulation, D indicates dark skin and ¬D indicates light skin. 
Setting is about the consequences of actions (or interventions). For example, we 
may wish to find out whether sunscreen use reduces the risk of melanoma. Contrary to 
what might be expected, this is not the same as finding the probability of melanoma 
amongst sunscreen users. We alluded to the difference above when we said that the 
probability of melanoma for sunscreen users does not indicate whether sunscreen use 
reduces the risk of developing melanoma since light-skinned people, who are at greater 
risk for melanoma, are more likely to use sunscreen than are people with dark skin, for 
whom the risk is smaller. Although 
! 
p M |DS( )  correctly counts the incidence of 
melanoma among dark-skinned sunscreen users, multiplying it by 
! 
p D | S( ) will not 
predict the posterior incidence of melanoma among dark-skinned sunscreen users in the 
new (setting) scenario, wherein everyone uses sunscreen, since it does not count dark-
skinned persons currently not using sunscreen. Thus, 
! 
p M |DS( )should be multiplied by 
                                                 
23 For this example, we use discrete probabilities, but the argument generalizes to continuous variables. 
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the proportion of all persons who are dark-skinned, assuming that the effect of Sunscreen 
among all the Ds will have the same effect as it does among those Ds who currently use 
sunscreen.  A symmetric argument applies to the second multiplicative term. Hence, to 
compute the effect of setting (as opposed to observing or seeing) S, we calculate:  
! 
p M | see S( )( ) = p M |DS( )p D( ) + p M |¬DS( )p ¬D( )                          (4.2) 
Pearl [23] shows that in terms of graphical structure, this is equivalent to 
removing the arc from Darkness to Sunscreen and recomputing the conditional 
probabilities accordingly. When we set Sunscreen, sunscreen use does not depend on skin 
colour. Thus, we are able to quantify the consequences of an intervention on the basis of 
observational data. 
Now we can return to our user’s exploration of the relationship between 
Sunscreen and Melanoma, using what she suspects is the correct model. Figure 4.7 shows 
the results of her first explorations with seeing. That the user has fixed the value of the 
Sunscreen variable is indicated by the green colour of the Sunscreen rectangle and by a 
line and a numeral showing the user-determined value for the variable. The other 
rectangles show the distribution of the Melanoma and Darkness variables given the value 
of the Sunscreen variable.  The user grabs the value of the Sunscreen variable, drags it up 
and down, and finds from the contrived data that Sunscreen and Melanoma are unrelated. 
Changes to Sunscreen change Darkness significantly – the bar goes up when Sunscreen 
goes down and down when Sunscreen goes up - but the bar in the Melanoma rectangle 
barely moves.  
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Figure 4.7: Melanoma doesn’t respond much to Sunscreen 
The statistical explanation, as we have said, is that Darkness acts as a confound. 
That is, light-skinned individuals are more likely to use sunscreen, but they are also more 
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likely to develop melanoma than dark-skinned people. An experienced data analyst 
would ask what happens when Sunscreen is manipulated after Darkness is first fixed at 
some value. This is shown in Figure 4.8. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Manipulating Sunscreen after fixing Darkness 
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The user must first choose to see a fixed value for the Darkness variable, and then 
see a range of values for Sunscreen by dragging it up and down. The before and after 
images in Figure 4.8 now reveal the relationship between Sunscreen and Melanoma. 
Whether Darkness is high or low, fixing Darkness, and then increasing Sunscreen results 
in a decrease to Melanoma. (The “shadow distribution” shows the distribution of the 
variable in the absence of such “fixing”, that is, it shows the unconditional or prior 
distribution of the variable represented.)   Manipulating a variable by seeing a value 
corresponds to computing conditional values of all other variables in the domain, given 
the observed value. So when the user fixes Darkness, expected values for Sunscreen and 
Melanoma are calculated based on the selected value for Darkness. When the user then 
sees different values for Sunscreen, Melanoma responds as expected. Moreover, the same 
result will obtain for any values the user chooses for the Darkness variable.  
The reason the user needs to perform a double seeing operation is that there are 
two paths of probabilistic influence from Sunscreen to Melanoma that cancel each other 
out. One is the direct path, and the other is the indirect path from Sunscreen to Darkness 
to Melanoma. (This is all the more confusing because this probabilistic path goes “against 
the arrows”.) By fixing the Darkness variable, the positive probabilistic path of influence 
from Sunscreen to Melanoma via Darkness is effectively blocked, and the software 
correctly shows this relationship. 
Because there are few potential confounds in this three node world, trying all see 
operations is not logistically difficult. However, in a richer dataset, this process may be 
cumbersome. This is where setting becomes important. If the user simply sets the 
Sunscreen variable, Melanoma responds appropriately, and more importantly, 
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consistently with the cause-effect relationship that actually exists in this (contrived) 
world. The before/after graphs in Figure 4.9 show the visualization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Results of setting Sunscreen  
To understand why this happens, revisit the semantics of setting as given above. 
The definition of setting cannot be derived mechanically from the axioms of probability, 
but rather uses probabilities from a known world in a novel way to make predictions 
about an unknown world resulting from an intervention. In terms of probabilistic 
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influences, setting accomplishes the same thing as the double seeing operation by 
canceling the positive probabilistic influence Sunscreen has via the path through 
Darkness. We mentioned earlier that this method has a simple and elegant interpretation 
in terms of the graphical models—the arc between Darkness and Sunscreen is erased, 
explicitly eliminating the positive causal path. 
The user is now in a position to understand not only the true causal relationship 
between sunscreen and melanoma but the role of skin colour as well. She can correct the 
output – and the input for the next iteration, if there is one, of the algorithm.24  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Such human correction does not depend on the visualization software to which we have referred but is 
greatly facilitated by it. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
Cartwright does not appear to object to the Markov condition, which describes a 
way of representing dependencies in a graph. Rather, she objects to what is commonly 
referred to as the Causal Markov condition, which describes the way a dependency graph 
represents causal relationships. Causal interpretation of a dependency graph depends on 
two assumptions about the relationship between dependency and causality (together with 
some definitions) and her arguments are directed against those two assumptions: what we 
have termed the Fundamental Assumption and the Faithfulness Assumption. According 
to the first, dependency implies causation, that is, if A and B are dependent, then A causes 
B, B causes A, or A and B have a hidden common cause.25 According to the second, all 
independencies reflect causal structure. 
The Factory example is presented as an example of dependencies that do not 
correspond to causal relationships in the way the Causal Markov condition describes. 
Some exegetical research led us to interpret it as an example, or at least an intended 
example, of dependency incompatible with the Fundamental Assumption, that is, 
dependency in the absence of causality. More precisely, the dependency between the 
variables representing the product and by-product of the factory is presented as existing 
in all contexts (that is, when the factory is conditioned on) yet non-causal – according to 
the example, there is no causal relationship between the product and by-product, nor is 
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there a hidden common cause. Cartwright claims that, where a cause operates 
probabilistically rather than deterministically, as, she asserts, most causes do, there is a 
probabilistic relationship between the operations whereby it produces its various effects. 
It is because of such “joint operations” that the effects of a probabilistic cause are 
dependent in all contexts even where there is no causal relationship between the effects.   
Causal graph algorithms pertain to variables defined as described in Chapter 2 and 
presume that there are no directed cycles between variables.  There are good reasons to 
think that many of Cartwright’s examples of non-causal dependencies fail to meet one or 
both requirements; both Cartwright’s factory example and her omnivorous shopper 
example are arguably vulnerable to this kind of objection.  
That aside, we have two main responses to Cartwright’s argument. Our secondary 
response addresses the critical dependence of her critique of the Causal Markov condition 
on a set of categories (“operation”, “joint operations”, “probabilistic relations”) 
exogenous to the formally defined structure of definitions and algorithms of which the 
Causal Markov condition is a part and against which her critique is ultimately directed. 
This extension of the ontology, combined with a lack of formal definitions for the new 
categories, makes her argument difficult to assess.  
A related point can be made about her understanding of causality. It is certainly 
no argument against Cartwright that she provides no definition of causality! However, 
she insists, on the one hand, and not unreasonably, that causality is polymorphic while, 
on the other, she asserts that the dependency between the product and by product of the 
exemplary factory is non-causal and, more generally, that effects of a probabilistic 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 In fact, this is the informal or loose version of that assumption. Strictly speaking, the dependency is 
dependency in all contexts and the causal relationship is direct, as between measured variables. 
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common cause are non-causally dependent. In light of the first claim, the second would 
seem to require some justification or explanation beyond what is provided.  
Our primary response is that, even if there are exceptions to the Fundamental 
Assumption, and therefore to the Causal Markov condition, neither these nor the causal 
inference algorithms that depend on them are thereby rendered useless. It is difficult to 
see how human causal inference, or, therefore, human life, could proceed without the 
Fundamental Assumption and the possibility that it might not be valid without exception 
is not particularly troubling. Few of the assumptions that are crucial to human reasoning 
meet such an exacting standard and it would not be altogether surprising if the 
Fundamental Assumption proved to be one of many such indispensable but not infallible 
principles.26  
If assumptions that are not universally valid are necessary and legitimate in 
human causal inference, we can expect them to be similarly necessary and legitimate in 
causal inference algorithms. While it is true that computers are singularly and notoriously 
ill equipped to deal with exceptions to general rules, causal inference algorithms can 
assist human reasoning about causality, though they cannot replace it. They are, in other 
words, tools, meant to be used by human beings as part of an iterative process of causal 
discovery. If there are exceptions to the Fundamental Assumption, then this is an area 
where human contributions and interventions will be required if the tool is to achieve its 
results, where such exceptions exist. But this does not mean that the tool is not eminently 
useful for all that: The current algorithms provide ways to mechanically process large 
quantities of data and construct a causal models capable of predicting the results of 
                                                 
26 Of course it would be eminently useful to understand the nature of such exceptions and the frequency 
with which they occur and, as we noted in the previous chapter, our secondary response is relevant here. 
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interventions in a meaningful way. This is a marvelous achievement, even if falls short of 
replacing human thought. 
Our response to Cartwright’s convincing argument against the Faithfulness 
Assumption parallels this primary response to her critique of the Fundamental 
Assumption, augmented by an example of how human intervention can correct and 
interpret the output of the algorithm where a violation of Faithfulness leads to an 
incorrect result. At the same time, the example demonstrates the capacity of a model to 
predict the consequences of an intervention. 
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